Lori Gruen on Samuel Dubose, Cecil the Lion and the ethics of avowal

In her Al-Jazeera America post today, Lori Gruen, author of Entangled Empathy, says: “I’ve always been leery of the zero-sum mentality that suggests if you protest against one injustice that means you privilege it over another injustice. This is a convenient and distracting narrative that weakens efforts toward social change. Who benefits when those struggling for a better world end up fighting with each other?” Her article brings to my mind those occasions on which I’ve been told that I shouldn’t be a feminist because men have problems, too. Feminist-interested folks should give this a read.

34 thoughts on “Lori Gruen on Samuel Dubose, Cecil the Lion and the ethics of avowal

  1. “’I’ve always been leery of the zero-sum mentality that suggests if you protest against one injustice that means you privilege it over another injustice.”

    But you shouldn’t be leery of the mentality that suggests that if white people *IN LARGE NUMBERS* express more protest, visible grief, and visceral outrage over the unjust murder of a lion a continent away than they do over the unjust murder of people in their own country, that suggests that we, white people, do, as a group, care about and privilege one injustice more than another.

    And fine, sure, you can also point out that individuals can express outrage over Cecil’s death and also care about Samuel’s death, too. But many Black Americans’ criticisms of what they are seeing right now is not a criticism of the fact that individual white people care about Cecil. That Is Not The Point.

    They are criticizing our collective lack of empathy:

    “Britni Danielle pointed out, “It’s not lost on me that the outpouring of love for Cecil, and the swift condemnation of his killer, is much more pronounced that the calls for justice for Renisha McBride or Rekia Boyd or Aiyana Jones.”

    I wish more people would acknowledge this point. I wish we would focus on the criticism regarding racism in the big picture, and not on how we (white people) got our feelings hurt.

  2. I disagree. And I’m not trolling here: I think this is important. Most of life IS a zero-sum game.

    (1) Resources for addressing injustices are finite. We set priorities. Reasonable, informed people of good disagree about the priorities and will, reasonably take on different projects. But whatever any individual, or group, takes on, it cannot effectively take on all injustices. And working to alleviate one injustice DOESN’T help alleviate others.

    (2) Specialization is efficient. And it doesn’t mean fighting others who are interested in a better world but concentrating one’s energies on the issues one believes are most important—about which one feels most passionate.

    That said I do think that some issues have gotten short shrift from feminists—specifically sex segregation in the labor force. Most women in the labor force do pink-collar shit work. IMHO feminists aren’t paying enough attention to this. Partly, perhaps, because they don’t see themselves, or their daughters or friends, personally in danger of being forced to do boring, physically constrained woman-shit. They don’t look at the supermarket checker and think: I escaped that by the skin of my teeth. And they don’t look at the guys doing manual labor and think: I wish I had that as a safety net so that I would be safe from waitressing, secretarial work, cashiering, child care, etc.

  3. I realize this is a short article, and you can’t do everything in such a short piece. However, the conclusion at the end of this article seems like a really, really big stretch:

    “If it were no longer acceptable to treat animals “as animals” and violate and kill them, the animalization process that serves to justify structures of white male power would be weakened. Weakening that structure is one way to avow the lives of those who were wantonly killed and perhaps allow more just social relations to develop from our grief and anger.”

    Really? Avoiding the killing of animals would weaken structures of white male power? Maybe it would, but the author has a long way to go to make the case for that. The job certainly isn’t done in this article. I have the utmost respect for people who work to end unjustified violence against animals, but for them to claim ipso facto that they’re working against structures of white male power seems borderline disingenuous to me. At the very least they need one hell of an argument for that claim. And that argument, if it exists, isn’t common enough knowledge for its conclusion to be asserted in a short piece.

  4. I’m with Stacey on this one; the contrast in empathy is striking and important to note. (And I say this as someone who finds hunting for trophies disgusting.)

  5. A better analogy to the “men have problems, too” response to feminism is the #alllivesmatter response to #blacklivesmatter.

  6. Matt Drabek: I do not believe you are fairly characterizing Gruen’s view or job in this short piece. Her contention is that “animalization” is one justification for the exploitation of people. Her statement seems to me almost trivially true that if the judgment of being animal-like has a negative valence (e.g., disposable at one’s pleasure) in the course of justifications for evil treatment, then it would weaken the justificatory power of the judgment if being animal-like is not seen as being disposable at one’s pleasure.
    This is, I assume we agree, not new, and on the contrary is very well-established in the past fifty years of literature on moral status in philosophy and especially feminist philosophy. As many have written, to identify women with animal-like behaviors in order to justify controlling or oppressing them, while holding men up as rational, human, capable of abstract thinking and self-discipline and notably not-animal-like, is problematic for animals, for women, and for men, a wrong-headed quest to uphold a hierarchical dualism in the strongest senses of the terms ‘hierarchical’ and ‘dualism.’ So I suggest that Gruen does not have a job to do to recap this well-established body of literature in a short op-ed on Al Jazeera America. For me there’s no “if it exists” to the existence of this argument.

  7. Kate: There’s a well established body of literature that has shown how things like objectification, dehumanization, et al. are harmful. And that undermining those things would do good.

    But I’m reading Gruen here as going well beyond this established point. In particular, right here: “If it were no longer acceptable to treat animals “as animals” and violate and kill them, the animalization process that serves to justify structures of white male power would be weakened.”

    That’s the stretch. It’s not at all well established that “no longer…treat[ing] animals “as animals”…” would accomplish any of these things. And it certainly doesn’t follow from anything in the article.

  8. I can see three reasons why people might care about the killing of Cecil the lion and want to protest.

    1) Because they think a wrong has been done to Cecil, and Cecil’s dependents, by killing him.
    2) Because they think the lion species is worth preserving, and that this sort of poaching is a serious conservation threat.
    3) Because they think this particular lion is an important piece of cultural property, so that a wrong has been done to the people of Zimbabwe, or the people of the world, by destroying that piece of property.

    I rather fear that a lot of the outrage is for reason (1). I can certainly see why that might be offensive for the reasons Stacey Goguen gives. Whatever your take on animal rights, it really shouldn’t licence thinking that the wrong done to a lion by killing it is larger than the wrong done to a human person by killing them. And if you empathise more with the family of a dead lion than the family of a dead human, you might want to worry about that.

    But more than that, (1) is just silly. Even if you think the killing of large mammals is a significant moral evil (I don’t) then it’s very hard to see what distinguishes this one from the vast number of other killings of large mammals done by humans or by other large mammals. (Anyone who thinks that a lion that gets shot by a hunter has been unusually unlucky in its death compared to other African mammals in safari parks, probably hasn’t been on a safari or watched many wildlife documentaries!)

    However, (2) and (3) are potentially pretty good reasons to be concerned and to protest. (I don’t know if they are actually good reasons in this case; for (3) I don’t know the details well enough and for (2) I gather it’s quite controversial whether managed big game hunting is good or bad for conservation.) Here the non-zero-sum point seems apposite. High rates of police shootings in the USA is a serious issue. So is biodiversity in general, and the value of living in a world with wild lions in particular. So is the preservation of cultural property. Protesting about one of those three indeed doesn’t seem to privilege it over the other two.

  9. (But, again, it’s a short article and Gruen’s a leading expert on these issues! It’s possible that there’s a good argument for this connection. It’s just not in this article.)

  10. David Wallace: “But more than that, (1) is just silly. Even if you think the killing of large mammals is a significant moral evil (I don’t) then it’s very hard to see what distinguishes this one from the vast number of other killings of large mammals done by humans or by other large mammals.”(Anyone who thinks that a lion that gets shot by a hunter has been unusually unlucky in its death compared to other African mammals in safari parks, probably hasn’t been on a safari or watched many wildlife documentaries!)”

    I think it fairly obvious that for many people, a mammal shot by a human hunter has a moral valence that a mammal killed by another non-human mammal lacks. I’m not understanding your indifference to a distinction between premeditated human killing versus opportunistic fellow-nonhuman killing. How is this hard to see? The human had to fly over an ocean and pay $50k to kill for a trophy, so, what’s not clear about the choices and responsibility of a human in such a situation? (I’m not trying to persuade you it’s an evil. I’m trying to understand how the distinguishability of humans’ trophy killing from a non-human encounter in the wild is obscure.)

    Your comment re:luck seems to ignore context, as this particular lion was apparently lured out of a place where he was protected, shot non-lethally with a bow, bled for forty hours and then was shot with a gun. So, yeah, I find his case one of a particularly unlucky critter. This also seems to me pretty clear. I have watched wildlife documentaries. Dentists aren’t wildlife. So, I’m still thinking I’m not silly.

  11. I’ll also add, because this came to my attention, people may be seeing different sets of criticisms. So in response to people saying “How dare you care about animals when there are suffering humans in the world,” point by Gruen and others is well taken.

    I’ll just then add that there are, separately, other criticisms of different aspects of these responses that are worth taking seriously.

  12. It is now a commonplace among psychologists that there are very important elements of human emotional/cognitive functioning that we are almost all ignorant about. So I wasn’t surprised that a very quick search on psych info turned up a recent article in a good journal that supports LG, and says its a case where we do not understand ourselves. I’m going to quote the abstract and try to get the fuller refs for another comment:

    We investigate laypeople’s beliefs about the causes of and solutions to out-group dehumanization and prejudice. Specifically,we examine whether nonexperts recognize the role that beliefs in the human–animal divide play in the formation and reduction of intergroup biases, as observed empirically in the interspecies model of prejudice. Interestingly, despite evidence in the present study that human–animal divide beliefs predict greater dehumanization and prejudice, participants strongly rejected the human–animal divide as a probable cause of (or solution to) dehumanization or prejudice. We conclude with a meta-analytic test of the relation between human–animal divide and prejudice (mean r = .34) in the literature, establishing the human–animal divide as an important but largely unrecognized prejudice precursor. Applied implications for the development and implementation of prejudice interventions are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved) (journal abstract)(My stress)

  13. The reference:
    Lay beliefs about the causes of and solutions to dehumanization and prejudice: Do nonexperts recognize the role of human–animal relations
    Costello, Kimberly, Department of Psychology, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada, kimberly.costello@brocku.ca
    Hodson, Gordon, Department of Psychology, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada
    Costello, Kimberly, Department of Psychology, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada, L2S 3A1, kimberly.costello@brocku.ca
    Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol 44(4), Apr, 2014. pp. 278-288.
    Page Count:
    United Kingdom : Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  14. Drabek is on point. Gruen’s claim — that no longer treating animals “as animals” would weaken “structures of white male power,” including re Blacks — is implausible, not least because the substantial rise of concern for animal experience and “rights” over the past 40 years has clearly not been accompanied by greater empathy for Black lives. Moreover, non-aggressive animals are generally seen as innocent, unlike persons, especially Blacks.

    Probably, though, Gruen’s claim is merely and stereotypically clueless. Had she read or thought a bit more about the “mentality” of those she uncharitably criticizes in the Cecil case, the basic point Goguen makes @1 might have become obvious.

    Worse for the efficacy of Gruen’s view of “avowal”: we actually have video of police lynchings in the DuBose, Rice, Crawford, and Garner cases, which could be expected to trigger the greatest empathy…were the victims not Black. Some of us don’t have the privilege to experience such video as “chilling” at a distance.

  15. Another consideration: recent research on children and moral judgments suggest that infants form moral views. But they do so while watching blocks helping or hindering each other. So do our moral concerns start out extending beyond our own species? If so, what’s the impact of being taught a human-animl divide? Just guessing: could we end up with a sense that who is really worthy of moral concern is conventional? That could explain a lot of evil.

    Another resource:

    Children’s environmental and moral conceptions of protecting an endangered animal.
    Ruckert, Jolina H., U Washington, US
    Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, Vol 75(12-B)(E), 2015.
    US : ProQuest Information & Learning
    Other Journal Titles:
    Dissertation Abstracts International
    0419-4217 (Print)
    Order Number:
    gray wolf, biocentric justice-oriented reasoning, moral obligatory judgments
    Emerging research suggests that children extend moral regard to the natural world (e.g., forests and waterways). When they do, their moral reasoning is predominately focused on human concerns, wherein the natural world has value insofar as it has value to humans. Biocentrism is the moral view that the natural world has value independent of its value to humans. Previous research has found only about 4% of children employed biocentric reasoning and that there was little evidence that it appeared in children younger than 10-12 years old. The research thus far has largely focused on scenarios where humans cause harm to non-sentient natural entities and ecosystems. The current study is the first to focus on children’s moral reasoning in the context of humans harming an animal species. Fifty-two children equally divided across two age groups (7- and 10-years-old, gender balanced) were interviewed regarding their understanding of, and beliefs/values about protecting an endangered animal (the gray wolf); their moral obligatory judgments towards humans harming the animal; and their conceptions of animal rights. Results showed that children as young as seven-years-old extended moral obligations to not harming the wolf. Children as young as seven-years-old endorsed biocentric reasoning, particularly in the form of intrinsic value concerns. Furthermore, there was a developmental shift in biocentric reasoning. Ten-year-olds were more likely to express justice-oriented biocentric reasoning (and did so to a greater degree) than the seven-year-old participants. Still, a substantial number of seven-year-olds endorsed biocentric justice-oriented reasoning. Implications for understanding the construction of moral concerns for the environment are discussed, and applications of these findings and future directions for research are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved)

  16. anon’, I’ve re-read Gruen’s criticisms, and I do not see the point at which she is uncharitable. Perhaps you and I define uncharitability differently.

    I am fairly confident that we all agree that “non-aggressive animals are generally seen as innocent, unlike persons, especially Blacks.” Like you, I attribute some of the ease of outrage over the lion’s death to this. But I am not seeing an extraordinary rise of concern for animal experience. There has been next to no viral-social-media sharing of news coverage of the elephants killed since Cecil the Lion was killed. “In recent years, the poaching of elephants has increased exponentially because of the demand for ivory in Asia, where it’s used for unproven medicinal purposes. Between 2010 and 2012, poachers killed more than 100,000 African elephants — a level of destruction that put the species on the road to extinction.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/29/as-the-world-mourned-cecil-the-lion-five-of-kenyas-endangered-elephants-were-slain/

  17. Anne, this is quite right. Part of what I am building on is the conceptual work (whether explicit or implicit) that animalization (that is, the process of constructing a value dualism in which those who count as human matter and those who count as animal don’t) plays in systems of oppression. Kate is right that we do have a substantial literature (feminist and ecofeminist) that has laid some of this groundwork.

    Matt, I am talking about “animalization” which not only provides justification for violating and killing animals, but also helps to naturalize those practices. I do appreciate your desire for a more carefully crafted argument. I and others have been developing these arguments, but there isn’t room in an op-ed in a popular media source designed to appeal to a non-philosophical audience.

  18. Sorry, that last comment is from me — Lori Gruen.

    I’d like to also respond to Anon:

    I’m not sure what evidence you have for my “mere and stereotypical” cluelessness or why you think I view any of these horrors against black bodies at a distance. I’m not sure what sort of assumptions you are making about me or my life or my relationships.

    I’m also not criticizing but rather urging people to consider moving beyond a zero sum framework for concern. Of course, different people will be moved by different atrocities, and someone above pointed out the obvious — we each have finite resources. An ethics of avowal would, I hope, help us see that those of us working against the dominant structures that render so many lives disposable only reinforce the status quo by pointing fingers and name calling, as you do in your post here.

  19. KateNorlock: I don’t doubt that you do not see Gruen’s criticisms of a “zero-sum mentality” and “this latest episode of oppression Olympics” re DuBose as uncharitable. But I don’t think this has much to do with defining “uncharitability differently” — unless you think I was being too charitable, a criticism I might make of myself after re-reading Gruen’s piece. Anyway, thank you for bringing her piece to the readership’s attention.

  20. Thanks, anon’, for replying. I better understand what you’re saying in light of your examples. I’ve read the phrase “oppression Olympics” in other contexts at other times, so I didn’t take it as mere snark. I wasn’t sure Lori Gruen was right to refer to it, but it seemed something on which she and I might differ and not an instance of uncharitability (so much as difference). I’m less clear on why a zero-sum mentality is an uncharitable attribution, since she didn’t say all criticisms are zero-sum. But some DO suggest that if you are bothered by X then you are not bothered by Y. And when they do, they’re presuming something zero-summy.

  21. I think “oh you only care about lions not people” interpretations are uncharitable because a huge part of the outrage about Cecil the lion’s death is is not about Cecil, but about the privileged white weenie who paid to shoot him. If the headline were, say, “Zimbabwean villager kills beloved lion because it was attacking his cattle” people wouldn’t be baying for the killer’s head.

    Without getting into anything about animal rights (why Cecil and why not factory farmed animals) or inverse speciesm (why Cecil and not the millions of children who die of preventable diseases of poverty every day?) I think all folks who care about social justice and a better tomorrow can make a big hand-holding circle and celebrate the nearly universal rage and disdain directed at the white weenie dude who took his sack of first world money and used it to feel like a powerful guy by going to a place where most people are poor and then luring and killing something there for nothing but a sick thrill. That outrage is pretty great and pretty important. It wouldn’t have existed 60 years ago.

  22. Over at Discrimination and Disadvantage I was asked to write something about why I wrote this Al Jazeera op-ed. I thought I’d share that here:

    A couple of days ago I was contacted to comment on this question by a reporter “Why are people more moved by animal suffering than human suffering?”

    I responded by saying that I thought that factually, this is false. People aren’t more moved by animal suffering than human suffering. A huge number of people I associate with are rightly outraged over the inexcusable killings of black people by police and this has increasingly led to urgent discussions about what needs to change. The Black Lives Matter movement is strong and it seems to me that support is growing. Its true that fewer people are concerned about another issue that matters to me a great deal – mass incarceration, but that too is changing. Even the POTUS is talking about rethinking the prison system (albeit through minimal reforms).

    Billions of non-human animals are killed every year as a matter of course, without much notice. So there really isn’t more concern for animal suffering than human suffering.

    I believe we should see the outcry over the illegal poaching of Cecil the Lion by a wealthy white dentist as not at odds with the horror of police violence, racism, and the carceral state but rather as another manifestation of a deep problem. The killing of Sandra Bland (yes, I think we should call it a killing), the execution of Samuel Dubuse, the murders of so many black men and women at the hands of police in the last year alone, the decapitation of Cecil, and commercialized mass animal slaughter – these horrible violations of life and freedom are necessary parts of a system that allow certain humans (white, male) to destroy those they can in order to maintain their power.

    Though some of us may feel more moved or more distraught by some acts of violence against the disempowered, I argue that putting these things in a zero-sum competitive frame only serves to embolden the white men in power.

    – See more at: http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/disability_and_disadvanta/#sthash.8e8mrQIg.dpuf

  23. Hi Lori (from 17)! I’m excited to read that material. I think one worry I might have is the possibility that even if “animalization” were undercut, the language is robust enough that whatever mechanism by which animalization contributes to violence can easily be duplicated by a different metaphor.

    There are plenty of examples of people dehumanizing others through comparison to pests or insects. I believe it was Rwanda where one ethnic group referred to another as “cockroaches” in the process of murdering them. Pat Robertson here in the US is famous for comparing atheists and homosexuals to termites and calling for a “godly fumigation.” Even the classical conservative Edmund Burke, I believe, compared his opponents to flies. And presumably appeals to animals’ rights wouldn’t cover, e.g., termites or cockroaches.

    And so I think maybe some of what would be needed to show that claim would be a clear mechanism for how animalization contributes to violence and some kind of story about why it’s special.

  24. Matt Drabek: You remind me of Peter Staudenmaier and Janet Biehl writing in _Ecofascism_ about the tendency for members of the Third Reich to naturalize social-kinds, such as referring to ill citizens or poor immigrants as a “cancer,” or referring to individual organisms as mere parts of a body politic. (I’m off on a tangent, I know, but wonder if you have also read that, if that’s the sort of thing you have in mind in above.)

  25. That’s obviously something I should check out – as it relates pretty clearly to the line I’ve taken in my own work (which is basically that a label is often used to single out a population, define it, and then mistreat it based on the attributes given to that population and the surrounding social practices created as a result).

    But it sounds like animalization is…something that maybe falls short of that, in the sense that I’m guessing no one is claiming that people *are* animals (i.e., it’s a comparison, not a naturalization of social kinds). For the sort of case I tend to be interested in, I have the benefit of being able to make use of the mechanism laid out by Ian Hacking in, e.g., Making Up People. I think maybe the story behind animalization might be more complicated, or just different or even more interesting.

  26. The Rwanda example mentioned by Matt Drabek in 23 is discussed in detail in Lynne Tirrell’s ‘Genocidal language games,’ in Maitra and McGowan (eds.) Speech and Harm.

  27. Anything that places a group of people into ‘other’ status creates a situation where they can be defined as prey.

    Also, if I mention that I am exhausted after a long day, I am not automatically attempting to tell anyone else that they are not similarly exhausted or that my exhaustion is somehow more valid than theirs…or even that I care more about one than the other.
    It is not logical to think that we should or even could encompass every pov into every assertion we make.

  28. Unfortunately, there are more than enough atrocities to go around.

    One of my own concerns (about which I often post on Facebook and get very little uptake) is the genocide of attrition in Sudan, which has claimed millions of “black lives.” In the spirit of Lori’s humane and insightful article, I think that the appropriate attitude is to work towards making these horrors more salient on others’ moral landscapes, rather than accusing those who are seemingly oblivious to them of moral impoverishment.

    On a different but related note, there is an expanding literature (mostly in social psychology) on the phenomenon of dehumanization (“animalization”). And it’s getting more and more scholarly attention from philosophers as well—as is evidenced (for example) by a panel on dehumanization at the 2015 ISHPSSB conference in Montreal and an upcoming issue of Social Theory and Practice containing papers from the amazing Dominating Speech conference at the University of Connecticut. My 2011 book Less Than Human is entirely devoted to dehumanization (in the specific sense of “animalization”). For anyone who might be interested, I currently have three articles on the subject posted on academia.edu. They are open to feedback and I would very much value your comments on and criticisms of them.

  29. Having read most of David Livingston’s papers on academia.edu, let me add a push to his invitation to look at them.

    Moral philosophy is really not my area of research, and I usually stumble when I try to engage in it. But I must say that I am getting worried by the discussion here that philosophy may need some help in its study of moral psychology. Hume, I think, argued well that many differences in our moral intuitions can be accounted for by the way our minds work. But a more vivid picture that is more easily available to us of the way that, e.g., child-adult interaction shape our world may need more study, at least by philosophers. E.g., children are taught a lot of their categorizing. How much of a society’s morality is inculcated in this way by the age of three seems potentially important.

  30. @ Kate Norlock,

    To be fair, there’s some background consequentialism in the way I framed the discussion. I’ll concede it’s probably possible to have a radically non-consequentialist take on why human hunting of animals is wrong that isn’t based around the harm caused to the animal.

    Having said that, I still find it really difficult to see a coherent ethical framework from which this particular act of human-on-animal killing isn’t vastly less ethically salient than an awful lot of more mundane acts of human-on-animal killing. But “silly” was probably a bit overquick, so apologies.

    As for luck, my actual comment was “Anyone who thinks that a lion that gets shot by a hunter has been unusually unlucky in its death compared to other African mammals in safari parks, probably hasn’t been on a safari or watched many wildlife documentaries!” Since the normal lot of an African mammal in a safari park is to get eaten alive, I think I stick by my comment. Whether it’s ethically better for an aging lion in particular to die from being shot rather than a year or two later to starve to death or die by infection after a fight with another lion (I think those are the typical ways apex predators die) is less obvious.

    @ Kathleen Lowry

    “I think all folks who care about social justice and a better tomorrow can make a big hand-holding circle and celebrate the nearly universal rage and disdain directed at the white weenie dude who took his sack of first world money and used it to feel like a powerful guy by going to a place where most people are poor and then luring and killing something there for nothing but a sick thrill.”

    Possibly other than the phrase “luring and”, that account covers pretty much all game hunting tourism. But it’s at best unclear that prohibitions on game hunting tourism are good for either conservation, or for the economies of the countries they occur in. I think there’s quite a bit of evidence that controlled rhino hunting, for instance, improves conservation outcomes, because now you make an area’s rhino herd a resource that’s valuable to local people, and so they will be less vulnerable to the big-money offers they get from poachers. One of the things I’d like in my “better tomorrow” is rhinos, so I for one am not celebrating. (Even though on an emotional level I can’t empathise at all with people who hunt for pleasure, and even though I suspect this particular hunt was ethically wrong.)

  31. “If you protest against one injustice that means you privilege it over another injustice.” what does that mean?? and also why does she think this idea of privileging one injustice over another weakens efforts toward social change ?

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