Call for Papers Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Special Issue:
‘Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory’
Deadline: Dec. 31, 2017
Guest Editors: Paul Giladi (University College Dublin), Nicola McMillan (Lancaster University), and Alison Stone (Lancaster University).
Confirmed contributors: José Medina, Danielle Petherbridge, Matt Congdon, Rebecca Tsosie, and Miranda Fricker (afterword)
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly seeks submissions for a special issue on Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory. An important development in contemporary Anglo-American feminist epistemology has been the concept of epistemic injustice, which, as articulated for example by Miranda Fricker, has emerged out of and re-invigorated a rich line of work in feminist epistemology on epistemic exclusion, silencing, subordination, and motivated ignorance, including work by Linda Alcoff, Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Charles Mills. Another important development in moral and political philosophy, especially in the Continental tradition, has been the philosophy of recognition. Recognition theory has roots in the work of Beauvoir and Fanon, although its most influential recent articulation has been by Axel Honneth, with debates about recognition and inclusion taken forward in feminist contexts by Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser amongst others.