Call for Papers Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Special Issue:
‘Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory’
Deadline: Dec. 31, 2017
Guest Editors: Paul Giladi (University College Dublin), Nicola McMillan (Lancaster University), and Alison Stone (Lancaster University).
Confirmed contributors: José Medina, Danielle Petherbridge, Matt Congdon, Rebecca Tsosie, and Miranda Fricker (afterword)
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly seeks submissions for a special issue on Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory. An important development in contemporary Anglo-American feminist epistemology has been the concept of epistemic injustice, which, as articulated for example by Miranda Fricker, has emerged out of and re-invigorated a rich line of work in feminist epistemology on epistemic exclusion, silencing, subordination, and motivated ignorance, including work by Linda Alcoff, Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Charles Mills. Another important development in moral and political philosophy, especially in the Continental tradition, has been the philosophy of recognition. Recognition theory has roots in the work of Beauvoir and Fanon, although its most influential recent articulation has been by Axel Honneth, with debates about recognition and inclusion taken forward in feminist contexts by Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser amongst others.
While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion, and silencing, current analysis and critique of these forms of injustice can potentially be improved and enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation. Recognition theory on the one hand, and contemporary epistemological work informed by feminism and critical race theory on the other, have developed largely separately from one another. Yet these fields of discussion have considerable bearing on one another. From a recognition theory perspective, the failure properly to recognise and afford somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit might be conceived as an act of recognition injustice. Perhaps part of the harm of epistemic injustice, exclusion, and silencing, then, is that of robbing a group or individual of their status as rational enquirer in a conversation, and so creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment.
The aim of this special issue is to open a dialogue between discussions of epistemic injustice and in recognition theory.
We invite contributing authors to consider how far these developments can and should inform and enrich one another. Questions that might be considered include the following, indicatively. Do relations of misrecognition underpin processes of epistemic exclusion and silencing, or do the latter instead underpin the former; or are the two mutually supporting? How well can different types of epistemic injustice—e.g., testimonial and hermeneutical—be understood as types of recognition injustice? What light can analyses of epistemic and recognition injustice shed on one another? What limitations do we discover in either or both types of analysis when we put them into conversation? What new questions and problems open up as a result of bringing these two fields of debate into conversation?
We are looking for papers that explore advantages of and/or difficulties with bringing thought on epistemic injustice and recognition together. We expect contributors to engage with existing feminist work in both strands of thought, including work by feminist philosophers of colour and critical race theorists.
Papers should be 9000 words maximum, exclusive of references, prepared for anonymous review with a separate cover page, and accompanied by an abstract of no more than 200 words.
The submission deadline is 31 December 2017.
Please feel free to contact a couple of the guest editors in advance of submission: paul.giladi at gmail dot com; n.mcmillan at lancaster.ac.uk.
Final submissions should be made electronically to the address fpqsi2018 at gmail dot com.