May 24-26, 2018 at the University of Notre Dame
Race, Gender, Ability, and Class:
Expanding Conversations in Analytic Theology
Guest Co-Organizer: Michelle Panchuk
Over the past several decades, scholars working in biblical, theological and religious studies have increasingly paid attention to the substantive ways that our experiences and understanding of God and God’s relation to the world are structured by our experiences and concepts of race, gender, ability, and class. These personal and social identities and the intersections between them (for better or worse) serve as a hermeneutical lens for our interpretations of God, self, one another and our religious texts and traditions. However, these topics have not received nearly the same level of attention from analytic theologians and philosophers of religion, and so a wide range of important issues remain ripe for analytic treatment. For example, what implications do the social concerns of liberation theology have for the kinds of questions with which analytic theologians and philosophers have more typically been concerned, and vice versa? How might our understanding that suffering and trauma are often inflicted by unjust social structures and religious communities inform our response to the problem of evil? To what extent does the historical use of a particular doctrine as a tool of oppression bear on its truth? How should analytic philosophical explications of doctrinal loci (e.g. creation, incarnation and the imago Dei) shape our understanding and theology of race, ability, gender, and class, and vice-versa? Do these identities circumscribe the kinds of religious experience or religious understanding that one is able or likely to have? The Logos 2018 Workshop will bring together analytic philosophers, scriptural scholars, and theologians/thealogians to discuss these and other aspects of the theological significance of personal and social identities.
To have your paper considered for presentation at Logos 2018, please submit an abstract of the paper or the paper itself no later than October 1, 2017. Other things being equal, preference will be given to those who submit full papers by the deadline. You will be notified by December 1, 2017 whether your paper has been provisionally accepted. Full acceptance will be conditional on submission of the full reading version of the paper by April 1, 2018. It is expected that papers presented at the Logos workshop will be works in progress that can benefit from the group discussion. Consequently, we ask that authors not submit papers that will be published before the conference has ended.
Please send Abstracts or Full Papers to: firstname.lastname@example.org
For more information, please visit: http://philreligion.nd.edu/calendar/annual-logos-workshop/
The article is from the CHE, June 29, 2017. I’m copying all of it below.
The deadlines and the fact that information about outcomes is shared are both important.
The University of California system has new policies to respond to allegations of sexual misconduct by faculty and staff members, the university announced in a news release on Thursday. Changes will be in place systemwide by September 1.
The changes include a clear timeline for completing investigations; chancellor or chancellor-designee approval of discipline proposed for a staff member’s supervisors; and informing complainants, as well as respondents, of all outcomes.
In the news release, Kathleen Salvaty, the system’s Title IX coordinator, said the new polices aimed to strengthen the adjudication process across campuses. “For the past year,” she said, “campuses have been hard at work shoring up their resources and improving their processes for implementation of these systems.”
Other changes include:
Clear roles and responsibilities for Title IX offices and other campus offices in the adjudication and discipline processes for cases of sexual harassment and violence.
Completion of investigations within 60 business days. And 40 days after an investigation is completed, a decision on discipline should be made. After an investigation, respondents and complainants can communicate with the decision maker about the outcome.
Review and approval by a chancellor or chancellor-designee of discipline proposed by a staff member’s supervisors. For faculty members, a peer-review committee on each campus will help the chancellor come up with a resolution that includes discipline. All complainants and respondents will be informed of any outcomes.
The policy also states that in sexual-misconduct cases the chancellor’s designee or a faculty-member review committee will add another level of deliberation to the process. The system’s Title IX office will train all parties to best make decisions about sexual misconduct.
Following up this post from a few days ago on Kipnis and epistemic injustice, readers of this blog may also be interested in a new collection of responses to Unwanted Advances hosted by Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.
A detailed review by Jeremy C. Young also appeared recently, titled “What Kind of Feminism Is This?”
Volume 3, issue 2 of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly is online, and the special issue is a symposium on Catharine MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, guest-edited by Lori Watson (University of San Diego). Contributions by Natalie Nenadic, Susan Brison, Elena Ruiz and Kristie Dotson, and Clare Chambers are followed by a response by Catharine A. MacKinnon.
As always, we are open-access, free for authors and free for readers, thanks to the free publishing platform provided by Western University and the grants and support from York University, University of Waterloo, and the Kenneth Mark Drain Chair in Ethics at Trent University.
A really important story from Tyler Kingkade at Buzzfeed.
Federal law requires universities to take certain steps when dealing with sexual misconduct on campus, and if it’s a case involving two students, schools have to disclose the outcome in writing to the accuser and to the accused. But there’s no similar requirement that they disclose what happens to faculty who are accused of harassment. Too often, critics say, schools agree to keep such accusations quiet if employees resign and go elsewhere. The system is known as “passing the trash,” and in higher education, the “trash” often refers to high-profile professors who bring status and money to universities that either ignore or are unaware of past scandals.
Read the whole story.
Lots of stories coming out. Sometimes I think perhaps philosophy isn’t especially bad, but rather that we were earlier than others to start talking about these things in public.
I continue to be deeply impressed by the work that Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa is doing on Laura Kipnis’s book. There’s so much that’s important in this post, on the epistemological moves and assumptions that Kipnis makes. Here’s one small sample.
When she starts talking about specific cases, Kipnis brings in more explicit epistemological assumptions. In a passage spanning pp. 66–71, Kipnis questions the methods of Joan Slavin, a Northwestern University Title IX officer who investigated allegations that Professor Peter Ludlow had gotten an undergraduate student (“Cho” is her pseudonym) drunk, pressured her to come to his apartment, and groped her. Kipnis goes over competing descriptions of several elements of the night, expressing disagreement with Slavin’s judgments of Cho’s credibility. E.g.:
For instance, according to Slavin, Ludlow told Cho that he thought she was attractive, “discussed his desire to have a romantic and sexual relationship” with her, and shared sexual information, all of which was unwelcome to her.
I’m dying to know how Slavin came to the conclusion that Ludlow wanted to have a romantic relationship with Cho. Because an evening spent drinking and going to galleries indicates a man’s desire for a relationship? If so, single women of America, your problems are over. (71)
Kipnis wonders how Slavin came to the conclusion that Ludlow said he wanted to have a romantic relationship with Cho? The obvious answer is: Cho told her. Kipnis often reaches for strange explanations for simple conclusions when she disagrees with them. Here, Slavin listened to Cho tell her that Ludlow said he wanted to have a relationship with her, and concluded that Ludlow probably told Cho that he wanted to have a relationship with her. Kipnis hypothesizes that Slavin is employing the implicit premise that an evening spent drinking and going to galleries indicates a man’s desire for a romantic relationship. This is the kind of premise one might need if young women’s testimony carries no epistemic significance. But if we don’t assume that, there’s no need to reach for such bizarrities.
I find myself thinking that the literature on epistemic injustice will soon be filled with Kipnis examples.
To read the whole post (and you should), go here.
Becca Rothfeld, a graduate student in philosophy at Harvard, has reviewed Sarah Ahmed’s Living a feminist Life, In the CHE, 6/25/2017. There is a lot to like about the review, and I’ve included below some of my favorite passages. The idea that the manifestations of sexism we may have to deal with are a kind of ethical stupidity certainly fits the experience we find recounted in what is it like to be a women in philosophy? In fact, the question I wwant to raise is about a very related claim. This is the claim that the problem is affective, not intellectural.
***In an earlier post I think I was raising something like this possibility. What I’d really like help with are the questions (a) How new is this thought and (b) who else has been saying it.***
I don’t really do ethical theory, but I’d think this is a common idea. However, then I remember that many of us are surprised by Eric Schwitzgebel’s finding that philosophers working in ethics are not more moral than those of us working in other areas. Is ethics too often treated like an intellectual exercise, as opposed to one that might engage our motivation? One antidote for this might be to include a section on what we get wrong in our obligations. (I may here be indebted to my Somerville tutors – Anscombe and Foot – who seldom left their students motivationally unchallenged.)
Quotes from the review:
How exhausting it is to have to defend your right to excel, and to take on the additional burden of having to explain that you shoulder this burden at all. Sometimes I find myself enmeshed in a nested doll of apologies, apologizing for apologizing until apology supplants apologia and the seed of self that once grounded it and “Sorry!” is all that’s left. The female cogito, the basis of a brutal gender dualism, is this: I’m sorry, therefore I am. We’re allowed to exist in the first place only because we’re pre-emptively sorry for it.
The problem, I think, is not intellectual but affective: Sexism in the university and in the world of arts and letters is more often a failure of empathy than a failure of understanding. Ahmed says as much: “Diversity work is emotional work,” she writes. Callousness and cruelty are a kind of ethical stupidity, and their remedy is a sentimental, not a theoretical, education.
Note: And now there’s a third: See end of post.
I just noticed a second cover which has a woman with her back to the reader. It makes me uneasy, but I’m sure there are other interpretations that can leave one feeling part of the endeavor. Mostly I thought it is an odd coincidence on which people might want to comment. We could think of this post as allowing an odd interlude for free association.
Let me note that Edouard posted several versions of his cover, and I don’t know that he selected the one I am showing. Each has the female figure with her back showing.
Readers may be interested in a new prize for long-form philosophical essays written for a general public audience. Up for grabs are publication in Philosophers’ Imprint, Aeon, Salon, and The Point, and $4,500. Below are details from the announcement.
We invite submissions of unpublished essays (minimum 3,000 words, maximum 8,000) with significant philosophical content or method by authors with significant philosophical training addressed primarily to the general reader. There is no restriction to any area of philosophy. In particular, there is no restriction to practical philosophy. Everyone from graduate students to emeritus professors is encouraged to apply.
The winner of the Marc Sanders Award for Public Philosophy will receive $4,500. The winning essay will be published in Philosophers’ Imprint, a free online journal specializing in major original contributions to philosophy. The second best essay will be published in Aeon, whose editorial staff will be available to help with the final draft. There will also be an opportunity for the winner(s) to present their work directly to a general audience.
The Award Committee is Chaired by Susan Wolf, Edna J. Koury Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at UNC Chapel Hill. The other committee members are Kenneth A. Taylor, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and co-host of Philosophy Talk; David Velleman, Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics at NYU and a founding co-Editor of Philosopher’s Imprint; Barry Maguire, Associate Professor at Stanford University; and Brigid Haines, Editorial Director at Aeon Magazine.
Deadline: 15 September, 2017
Please submit your entry to email@example.com by 15 September 2017. Please include the essay title in the Subject line. Receipt of submissions will be acknowledged by email. Refereeing will be blind; authors should omit all remarks and references that might disclose their identities. Unlike other Marc Sanders Prizes there is no restriction to junior candidates. Philosophers at any career stage are encouraged to submit. No more than one submission per person. Previously published essays will not be considered.
Any inquiries should be sent to Barry Maguire at firstname.lastname@example.org.